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Non-technical summary 
Ever since the Economic and Monetary Union came into effect, a lot of ink has been spilt on 
the question of how soon the new EU member states should join the euro area. Until recently, 
the dominant view seemed to be that a small converging economy can benefit a lot from 
joining a monetary union with more advanced economies. It was pointed out that the related 
decrease in the country’s risk premium leads to a drop in the nominal and, ceteris paribus, 
also the real interest rates. This, along with the microeconomic efficiency gains resulting from 
the elimination of exchange rate risk, should boost domestic investment and bring about a 
faster economic growth in the longer term. It was also argued that the costs of monetary 
integration, arising from the loss of independent monetary policy and the exchange rate 
instrument, should be low for most new member states. Arguably, these costs are negligible 
or non-existent for those counties, such as the Baltic states, which already form an 
“asymmetric monetary union” with the euro area via a currency board or another hard peg 
against the euro. 
However, the recent experience of several countries at the euro area’s periphery as well as the 
Baltic states has shown that the drop in interest rates resulting from monetary integration can 
be a mixed blessing. Specifically, if the natural (neutral) real interest rate in a converging 
economy is significantly higher than the monetary union’s average, the post-accession 
expansion in that economy can easily turn into a boom-bust cycle, i.e. very rapid growth 
followed by a steep decline in the economic activity. Such cycles are detrimental to the 
macroeconomic and financial stability and thus to the country’s long-term growth. Therefore, 
we argue that the risk of a boom-bust cycle is an important potential cost that a converging 
economy envisages when joining a monetary union with more advanced economies. 
The goal of this paper is, firstly, to determine which structural characteristics of an economy 
make it more (or less) prone to macroeconomic booms and busts and, secondly, to empirically 
assess the risk of a boom-bust cycle in Poland after the euro adoption. Our analysis proceeds 
in three steps. In the first step, we identify booms and busts in private consumption and 
private investment in fourteen “old” EU member states, i.e. those countries which were 
members of the EU prior to its enlargement of 2004, except for Luxembourg. The 
identification of booms and busts is based on three different methods which were employed in 
previous empirical studies focusing on boom-bust cycles in credit and asset price markets. 
The sample covers the period 1970 to 2009 and thus it ends before the entire impact of the 
global financial crisis on consumption and investment in the EU became manifest. In the 
second step, we seek to explain the identified boom and bust series using panel probit models 
with random effects and pooled probit models. In the third step, we use the equations 
estimated for the “old” EU to assess the probability of booms and busts in Poland in the years 
2004 to 2009. We repeat this exercise for two different sets of assumptions: firstly, that 
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Poland joined the ERM II immediately upon EU accession in 2004 and adopted the euro in 
2007, and secondly, that it did not join either the ERM II or the euro area until at least 2009. 
The results of both scenarios – respectively the quick euro adoption and the real scenario – are 
compared to assess whether a rapid euro adoption would have increased the probability of a 
boom when the global economic activity was high, and the probability of a bust when the 
global financial crisis hit. 
The contribution of this paper is, correspondingly, threefold. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to identify booms and busts in macroeconomic aggregates 
such as private consumption and investment; previous studies were only concerned with 
booms and busts in asset prices or credit developments. Secondly, we are among the first to 
empirically analyse the specific mechanisms contributing to the emergence of macroeconomic 
booms and busts in the “old” EU. Thirdly, we make a small contribution to the debate 
concerning the costs and benefits of a relatively early euro adoption in Poland. 
Our results suggest that credit developments have clearly been the most important driving 
force of booms and busts in EU-14, which points to the crucial role of the financial 
accelerator mechanism. The relevance of international capital flows as a transmission channel 
is also confirmed, albeit mainly for busts rather than booms. Interestingly, a higher degree of 
financial openness is coupled with a lower, not higher, probability of a consumption boom. 
Variables that capture the cyclical heterogeneity of countries which undergo a process of 
monetary integration are also significant. Strikingly, converging economies in our sample 
have been less, not more, prone to consumption booms, and it appears that participation in the 
EC or EU lowers the probability of a boom for both converging and non-converging 
economies but more strongly for the former. Finally, we find evidence that the working of the 
fiscal channel is contrary to our expectations and boils down to a crowding-out effect: a 
reduction in the general government expenditure “makes room” for a boom in the private 
expenditure, and the reverse holds for busts. 
As regards the forecast for Poland, our results are rather inconclusive, which means that either 
the models estimated for EU-14 are not adequate for Poland, or – which is a less probable 
outcome – that a rapid euro adoption would not have significantly affected the probability of a 
boom-bust cycle in Poland. In any case, there are certain lessons to be drawn from the 
experience of EU-14, most notably that preventing an excessive credit expansion should be 
the main policy objective if Poland is to avoid the vicious cycle of macroeconomic booms and 
busts both in the euro area and before accession. A better cyclical alignment with the euro 
area’s core countries, such as Germany, should also contribute to a lower probability of 
booms and busts. Non-technical summary
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Poland joined the ERM II immediately upon EU accession in 2004 and adopted the euro in 
2007, and secondly, that it did not join either the ERM II or the euro area until at least 2009. 
The results of both scenarios – respectively the quick euro adoption and the real scenario – are 
compared to assess whether a rapid euro adoption would have increased the probability of a 
boom when the global economic activity was high, and the probability of a bust when the 
global financial crisis hit. 
The contribution of this paper is, correspondingly, threefold. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to identify booms and busts in macroeconomic aggregates 
such as private consumption and investment; previous studies were only concerned with 
booms and busts in asset prices or credit developments. Secondly, we are among the first to 
empirically analyse the specific mechanisms contributing to the emergence of macroeconomic 
booms and busts in the “old” EU. Thirdly, we make a small contribution to the debate 
concerning the costs and benefits of a relatively early euro adoption in Poland. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the relevant literature concerned with boom-bust cycles on the one hand and the 
macroeconomic effects of the euro adoption in converging economies on the other hand. 
Section 3 reviews the major transmission channels or mechanisms conducive to boom-busts 
cycles. Section 4 describes the three methods used to identify booms and busts in private 
consumption and investment in the “old” EU member states and concisely summarises the 
results of the identification exercise. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology employed 
to explain the previously identified booms and busts as well as the explanatory variables, and 
it further discusses the results of the analysis regarding both the “old” EU and Poland. The 
last section addresses some important caveats, most notably those related to the Lucas 
critique, summarises the main results and concludes. 
2 Overview of the literature 
This paper builds upon two strands of literature: studies that analyse booms and busts on the 
one hand and those concerned with the macroeconomic consequences of the euro adoption in 
Poland on the other hand. 
As regards the first group of studies, several of them start from the empirical identification of 
boom and bust episodes in a panel of countries. There is no single and generally accepted 
definition of a boom or bust; they can be defined respectively as a period of exceptionally fast 
growth in a given (macro)economic variable and a period of exceptionally strong fall in (the 
growth rate of) that variable. How to understand the term “exceptionally strong” is a matter of 
interpretation and so these papers try to make the above definitions operational by setting 
quantitative thresholds above/below which the growth/decline becomes a boom/bust. The Introduction
WORKING PAPER No. 103 7
1
4 
Poland joined the ERM II immediately upon EU accession in 2004 and adopted the euro in 
2007, and secondly, that it did not join either the ERM II or the euro area until at least 2009. 
The results of both scenarios – respectively the quick euro adoption and the real scenario – are 
compared to assess whether a rapid euro adoption would have increased the probability of a 
boom when the global economic activity was high, and the probability of a bust when the 
global financial crisis hit. 
The contribution of this paper is, correspondingly, threefold. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to identify booms and busts in macroeconomic aggregates 
such as private consumption and investment; previous studies were only concerned with 
booms and busts in asset prices or credit developments. Secondly, we are among the first to 
empirically analyse the specific mechanisms contributing to the emergence of macroeconomic 
booms and busts in the “old” EU. Thirdly, we make a small contribution to the debate 
concerning the costs and benefits of a relatively early euro adoption in Poland. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the relevant literature concerned with boom-bust cycles on the one hand and the 
macroeconomic effects of the euro adoption in converging economies on the other hand. 
Section 3 reviews the major transmission channels or mechanisms conducive to boom-busts 
cycles. Section 4 describes the three methods used to identify booms and busts in private 
consumption and investment in the “old” EU member states and concisely summarises the 
results of the identification exercise. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology employed 
to explain the previously identified booms and busts as well as the explanatory variables, and 
it further discusses the results of the analysis regarding both the “old” EU and Poland. The 
last section addresses some important caveats, most notably those related to the Lucas 
critique, summarises the main results and concludes. 
2 Overview of the literature 
This paper builds upon two strands of literature: studies that analyse booms and busts on the 
one hand and those concerned with the macroeconomic consequences of the euro adoption in 
Poland on the other hand. 
As regards the first group of studies, several of them start from the empirical identification of 
boom and bust episodes in a panel of countries. There is no single and generally accepted 
definition of a boom or bust; they can be defined respectively as a period of exceptionally fast 
growth in a given (macro)economic variable and a period of exceptionally strong fall in (the 
growth rate of) that variable. How to understand the term “exceptionally strong” is a matter of 
interpretation and so these papers try to make the above definitions operational by setting 
quantitative thresholds above/below which the growth/decline becomes a boom/bust. The Overview of the literature
National Bank of Poland 8
2
4 
Poland joined the ERM II immediately upon EU accession in 2004 and adopted the euro in 
2007, and secondly, that it did not join either the ERM II or the euro area until at least 2009. 
The results of both scenarios – respectively the quick euro adoption and the real scenario – are 
compared to assess whether a rapid euro adoption would have increased the probability of a 
boom when the global economic activity was high, and the probability of a bust when the 
global financial crisis hit. 
The contribution of this paper is, correspondingly, threefold. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to identify booms and busts in macroeconomic aggregates 
such as private consumption and investment; previous studies were only concerned with 
booms and busts in asset prices or credit developments. Secondly, we are among the first to 
empirically analyse the specific mechanisms contributing to the emergence of macroeconomic 
booms and busts in the “old” EU. Thirdly, we make a small contribution to the debate 
concerning the costs and benefits of a relatively early euro adoption in Poland. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the relevant literature concerned with boom-bust cycles on the one hand and the 
macroeconomic effects of the euro adoption in converging economies on the other hand. 
Section 3 reviews the major transmission channels or mechanisms conducive to boom-busts 
cycles. Section 4 describes the three methods used to identify booms and busts in private 
consumption and investment in the “old” EU member states and concisely summarises the 
results of the identification exercise. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology employed 
to explain the previously identified booms and busts as well as the explanatory variables, and 
it further discusses the results of the analysis regarding both the “old” EU and Poland. The 
last section addresses some important caveats, most notably those related to the Lucas 
critique, summarises the main results and concludes. 
2 Overview of the literature 
This paper builds upon two strands of literature: studies that analyse booms and busts on the 
one hand and those concerned with the macroeconomic consequences of the euro adoption in 
Poland on the other hand. 
As regards the first group of studies, several of them start from the empirical identification of 
boom and bust episodes in a panel of countries. There is no single and generally accepted 
definition of a boom or bust; they can be defined respectively as a period of exceptionally fast 
growth in a given (macro)economic variable and a period of exceptionally strong fall in (the 
growth rate of) that variable. How to understand the term “exceptionally strong” is a matter of 
interpretation and so these papers try to make the above definitions operational by setting 
quantitative thresholds above/below which the growth/decline becomes a boom/bust. The 
5 
focus so far has been either on credit developments (Gourinchas et al. 2001; IMF 2004; 
Cottarelli et al. 2005; Mendoza and Terrones 2008) or on asset prices, including housing 
prices (Bordo  and Jeanne 2002; Kakes and Ullersma 2003; Jaeger and Schuknecht 2007; 
Agnello and Schuknecht 2009; IMF 2009). Some of these papers also analyse the “anatomy” 
of booms and busts using event study techniques, i.e. they look at the behaviour of various 
macroeconomic aggregates before, during and after booms and busts. The identification of 
boom and bust episodes is also the point of departure of our empirical analysis but, in contrast 
to the previous studies, we focus on private consumption and private investment. 
Further, many papers in this strand of literature look at the transmission channels or 
mechanisms contributing to the emergence of boom-bust cycles. On the empirical side, 
Bakker and Gulde (2010) offer a very comprehensive analysis of the recent credit booms and 
the subsequent busts in the new EU member states. They argue that the severe boom-bust 
cycles in these countries were, to a large extent, the result of “bad luck” rather than bad 
policies: the boom was largely driven by high global liquidity and strong foreign capital 
inflows, and the bust was brought about by the global financial crisis. Similar conclusions are 
reached by Brixiova et al. (2010) who examine the shocks, institutions and policies which 
made the Estonian boom-bust cycle so severe. The authors point out that the currency board 
arrangement, financial liberalisation and “credit democratisation” along with benign global 
conditions were conducive to massive capital inflows, fuelling an unsustainable credit 
expansion. Kuodis and Ramanauskas (2009), in turn, apart from stressing the role of the same 
factors in fuelling the boom-bust cycle in Lithuania, make a point that ill-devised economic 
legislation and pro-cyclical fiscal policy aggravated the vicious cycle of credit acceleration. 
On the theoretical side, the analysis of macroeconomic boom-bust cycles within a general 
equilibrium framework put forward by Fagan and Gaspar (2007) is an important reference. 
They focus on the case of a small open economy which, upon accession to a monetary union, 
is faced with a reduction in the exogenous risk premium and easier access to external 
financing. Their model is able to replicate the stylised facts regarding the effects of interest 
rate convergence in the euro area’s peripheral economies (Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal), 
notably an increase in aggregate expenditure and a fall in savings, significant current account 
deficits, real exchange rate appreciation, and the accumulation of household debt and of a 
negative net foreign asset position. A very recent paper in this vain is that of Landmann 
(2011) who presents a stylised theoretical model aiming to explain non-synchronised output 
and inflation movements in a monetary union. 
To our knowledge, only two papers – Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2010) and Torój (2011) – deal 
with the issue of boom-bust cycles upon the euro adoption within general equilibrium models 
calibrated for Poland. These papers thus combine the two strands of literature which our study 
touches upon. In the former paper, the euro adoption shock is modelled as a permanent 
decrease in the target level of net foreign assets, reflecting the related credibility shift. The Overview of the literature
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resulting boom-bust cycle can be smoothed by adequately designed policies; simulations 
show that a revaluation of the central parity against the euro prior to accession is the most 
effective one. The second paper jointly analyses the competitiveness and the real interest rate 
channels as the equilibrating and disequilibrating forces in a monetary union. Having 
compared Poland and Slovakia based on simulations, the author concludes that the latter 
country is more capable of handling asymmetric shocks under a common monetary policy. 
As regards the second group of studies, the literature concerning the macroeconomic effects 
of the euro adoption in the new EU member states is vast. For the case of Poland, this issue is 
discussed in depth e.g. in the two reports prepared by the National Bank of Poland (NBP 
2004; NBP 2009). The references provided therein cover the most important aspects of the 
European monetary integration. 
Several studies deserve special attention as they deal explicitly with the possibility of boom-
bust cycles developing after the euro adoption. Apart from the above-cited paper of Brzoza-
Brzezina et al. (2010) and our analysis, however, virtually all studies concentrate on credit 
market developments rather than booms and busts in macroeconomic aggregates such as 
consumption and investment. For instance, Schadler et al. (2005) offer an early but 
comprehensive overview of the different aspects of the euro adoption, including the probable 
credit market developments, in five Central European countries, among them Poland. Their 
simulations suggest that the convergence towards the euro area should bring about very rapid 
credit expansion
1. Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) conducts a similar exercise concentrating on the 
expected loan developments in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland during the euro 
accession process against the background of the euro area periphery: Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. He concludes that, even though relatively strong credit growth could be expected for 
the three new EU member states, the potential for credit boom-bust cycles is lower than it 
used to be for the euro area periphery. The main reason for this conclusion is that, as of 2004, 
the new member states were more advanced in terms of nominal convergence against the euro 
area than was the latter group of countries five years before they acceded to the EMU. 
Eichengreen and Steiner (2008), in turn, concentrate on the case of Poland and analyse the 
potential for boom-bust cycles in the years to come. Their conclusions are mixed: on the one 
hand, at the time of their writing Poland remained an outlier compared with other Central and 
Eastern European countries due to the relatively slow credit growth, which increased the 
danger of a boom (assuming mean reversion). On the other hand, as the nominal interest rates 
had already come closer to the euro area levels, the euro accession as such should not fuel a 
severe boom. Inevitably, the conclusions from different studies may vary and so it appears 
                                                 
1 Cottarelli et al. (2005) scrutinise the credit market conditions in Central Europe and the Balkans and also 
attempt to model the future loan developments. They conclude that the credit to GDP ratios are (or were at the 
time of their writing) substantially undersized relative to their equilibrium values and thus rapid credit growth in 
those countries should be expected in the years to come. However, the authors do not point to the euro area 
accession as the main reason behind the expected credit acceleration. 
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insightful to contribute to the debate by empirically analysing the potential for booms and 
busts in consumption and investment based on the results obtained for the “old” EU. 
3 Boom-bust cycles: major transmission channels 
In theory, several mechanisms can contribute to the emergence of boom-bust cycles, most 
notably: (1) the financial accelerator, (2) international capital flows, (3) the real interest rate 
channel in a heterogeneous monetary union, (4) the fiscal channel. In the following, we will 
regard each of these in turn (see also the discussion in Martin et al. 2007). 
Macroeconomic booms and busts are often associated with cyclical upturns and downturns in 
asset prices. The link between the macroeconomy and asset markets can be explained by the 
financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; 
Bernanke et al. 1999) whose working results from credit market imperfections, such as 
information asymmetry or institutional shortcomings. Due to those imperfections, agents may 
face borrowing constraints which can be relaxed or tightened depending on the value of the 
collateral that can be brought up. Under such conditions, asset price shocks are magnified by 
balance sheet effects, and they affect the real economy. 
Specifically, a positive shock to asset prices, by increasing the collateral value of assets, 
relaxes agents’ borrowing constraints, leading to a rise in the volume of credit in the 
economy. The resulting increase in the demand for assets leads to further increases in asset 
prices, further relaxation of the borrowing constraint and further credit expansion, and so on. 
As a consequence of the larger credit volume and the rise in Tobin’s q, investment 
expenditure of firms rises, and in the presence of wealth effects, consumption expenditure of 
households also increases. GDP growth thus accelerates, raising total income and boosting 
expectations about the future, which again tends to inflate asset prices and aggregate 
spending. In this way, the boom in asset prices is passed on to the real economy and then 
magnified by feedback effects. Overinvestment in some sectors, above all building and 
construction, is often the result, along with an acceleration of wages in those sectors. At some 
point, asset prices must stop rising and eventually collapse, which adversely affects both asset 
markets and the real economy via the same mechanisms as those already described. The 
resulting macroeconomic bust can be severe, depending on the magnitude of the imbalances 
that accumulated during the boom phase. In is worth noting that the financial accelerator may 
work best in advanced economies due to the depth of their credit and asset markets, but its 
importance was also confirmed for several emerging market economies (Gertler et al. 2007; 
Brei and Buzaushina 2009). Boom-bust cycles: major transmission channels
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International capital flows, in turn, have been a common factor behind many booms and 
busts in emerging market economies (IMF 2004
2; Williamson 2005; Bakker and Gulde 2010), 
which are more dependent on foreign capital import due to the relatively low level of 
domestic saving. However, this channel can also play a significant role in fuelling advanced 
countries’ booms and busts
3. International capital flows affect the real economy through the 
credit market and tend to reinforce the financial accelerator channel. 
Specifically, in a fixed exchange rate regime the inflow of foreign capital contributes to lower 
interest rates and possibly – when it leads to (unsterilised) central bank intervention – to a rise 
in base money, which has the usual expansionary effect on the economic activity. Moreover, 
if the flows are mainly channelled to the domestic banking system, they often lead to the 
expansion of credit to the non-financial sector, which again boosts the aggregate expenditure 
and GDP growth. In turn, when the exchange rate is floating, capital inflows favour its 
appreciation. This in itself should have a demand-switching effect, i.e. lead to a decline in net 
exports and thus lower GDP growth. However, the fact that exchange rate appreciation is 
conducive to lower inflation means that the policy interest rate can be lower than it would 
otherwise be, which is conducive to stronger economic activity. If capital inflows and the 
resulting appreciation are exceptionally strong, the central bank might want to discourage an 
overshooting of the domestic currency and thus delay interest rate hikes even when expected 
inflation in the monetary policy transmission horizon is relatively high. Furthermore, as in the 
fixed exchange rate regime, if capital mainly flows into the domestic banking system, the 
credit volume expands, bringing about increased spending and higher GDP growth. In 
addition, a sustained appreciation often leads to a belief that foreign exchange denominated 
loans, especially mortgage loans whose repayment constitutes a large burden for households, 
are considerably cheaper than those denominated in the domestic currency. To the extent that 
banks are able and willing to meet the rising demand for foreign currency denominated loans, 
the volume of those loans increases – often to a large extent, given that banks may be inclined 
to take larger risks when they experience a continuing inflow of capital from abroad. Finally, 
if the foreign capital is flowing into the sovereign debt market, under both exchange rate 
regimes the government may increase its expenditure, additionally fuelling domestic demand, 
and its debt (especially the part that is denominated in foreign currencies) expands. These 
developments are often accompanied by rapidly increasing asset prices, and the financial 
accelerator mechanism discussed above sets in as well. All these factors are conducive to a 
credit-financed boom and a build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. 
                                                 
2 IMF (2004) looks at credit market developments in 28 emerging market economies over 1970–2002 and shows 
that large capital inflows preceded over half of episodes identified as credit booms. 
3 For instance, the empirical analysis of Sá and Wieladek (2010) shows that in the first half of the 2000s, capital 
inflows to the United States played a bigger role in generating the U.S. house price boom than the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy loosening. 
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Under such circumstances, a reversal of capital flows (sudden stop) inevitably generates 
downward pressure on the domestic currency. In a fixed exchange rate regime, the central 
bank needs to raise interest rates significantly in order to defend the peg. This, apart from the 
usual contractionary effect on the domestic economic activity, increases the burden of debt 
repayment for all agents involved. Under floating, there may be no interest rate hikes if the 
central bank allows the domestic currency to give in to the depreciate pressure, but if this 
pressure is large enough, the interest rates may be kept above the level that is consistent with 
the price stability objective. As a result, the burden of debt repayment – especially of foreign-
currency denominated debt – increases markedly, similarly as in the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Moreover, regardless of the exchange rate regime, a sudden stop is usually followed 
by a reversal in asset prices and thus a decline in their collateral value. Both factors (higher 
debt repayment burden and lower collateral value of assets) negatively affect agents’ balance 
sheets, leading to a worsening of banks’ portfolio and tensions in the domestic banking 
system and causing banks to curb the credit supply. If sovereign debt is also affected by the 
interest rate increases or domestic currency depreciation, the government may need to tighten 
fiscal policy. As a consequence of all these developments, aggregate demand and GDP 
growth collapse and the boom turns to a bust. In the worst case scenario, a sudden stop may 
lead to a fully-fledged financial crisis: a banking, currency or debt crisis. 
The  real interest rate channel in a heterogeneous monetary union offers another 
explanation for the emergence of boom-bust cycles (Brzoza-Brzezina et al. 2010; Torój 2009; 
Landmann 2011). Walters (1994) was among the first to point out that common monetary 
policy in the prospective Economic and Monetary Union can prove to be procyclical in the 
case of individual economies (“Walters critique”). This generally results from some sort of 
heterogeneity of the economies making up the monetary union; this heterogeneity can be 
manifested in asymmetric (i.e. country specific) shocks, low synchronisation of economic 
cycles within the union, or different levels of the natural real interest rate. 
Accordingly, a boom specific to one member state of a monetary union is initially caused by a 
positive relative output gap, which can be generated by an aggregate demand shock, a more 
favourable cyclical position compared to the rest of the union, or the accession to the 
monetary union and the related drop in the nominal and real interest rates below the 
equilibrium level
4. The resulting increase in the domestic inflation above the union’s average 
leads to a drop in the ex post real interest rates, and under adaptive inflation expectations (or 
under rational expectations in the presence of price rigidities) the same holds for the ex ante
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International capital flows, in turn, have been a common factor behind many booms and 
busts in emerging market economies (IMF 2004
2; Williamson 2005; Bakker and Gulde 2010), 
which are more dependent on foreign capital import due to the relatively low level of 
domestic saving. However, this channel can also play a significant role in fuelling advanced 
countries’ booms and busts
3. International capital flows affect the real economy through the 
credit market and tend to reinforce the financial accelerator channel. 
Specifically, in a fixed exchange rate regime the inflow of foreign capital contributes to lower 
interest rates and possibly – when it leads to (unsterilised) central bank intervention – to a rise 
in base money, which has the usual expansionary effect on the economic activity. Moreover, 
if the flows are mainly channelled to the domestic banking system, they often lead to the 
expansion of credit to the non-financial sector, which again boosts the aggregate expenditure 
and GDP growth. In turn, when the exchange rate is floating, capital inflows favour its 
appreciation. This in itself should have a demand-switching effect, i.e. lead to a decline in net 
exports and thus lower GDP growth. However, the fact that exchange rate appreciation is 
conducive to lower inflation means that the policy interest rate can be lower than it would 
otherwise be, which is conducive to stronger economic activity. If capital inflows and the 
resulting appreciation are exceptionally strong, the central bank might want to discourage an 
overshooting of the domestic currency and thus delay interest rate hikes even when expected 
inflation in the monetary policy transmission horizon is relatively high. Furthermore, as in the 
fixed exchange rate regime, if capital mainly flows into the domestic banking system, the 
credit volume expands, bringing about increased spending and higher GDP growth. In 
addition, a sustained appreciation often leads to a belief that foreign exchange denominated 
loans, especially mortgage loans whose repayment constitutes a large burden for households, 
are considerably cheaper than those denominated in the domestic currency. To the extent that 
banks are able and willing to meet the rising demand for foreign currency denominated loans, 
the volume of those loans increases – often to a large extent, given that banks may be inclined 
to take larger risks when they experience a continuing inflow of capital from abroad. Finally, 
if the foreign capital is flowing into the sovereign debt market, under both exchange rate 
regimes the government may increase its expenditure, additionally fuelling domestic demand, 
and its debt (especially the part that is denominated in foreign currencies) expands. These 
developments are often accompanied by rapidly increasing asset prices, and the financial 
accelerator mechanism discussed above sets in as well. All these factors are conducive to a 
credit-financed boom and a build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. 
                                                 
2 IMF (2004) looks at credit market developments in 28 emerging market economies over 1970–2002 and shows 
that large capital inflows preceded over half of episodes identified as credit booms. 
3 For instance, the empirical analysis of Sá and Wieladek (2010) shows that in the first half of the 2000s, capital 
inflows to the United States played a bigger role in generating the U.S. house price boom than the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy loosening. 
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Under such circumstances, a reversal of capital flows (sudden stop) inevitably generates 
downward pressure on the domestic currency. In a fixed exchange rate regime, the central 
bank needs to raise interest rates significantly in order to defend the peg. This, apart from the 
usual contractionary effect on the domestic economic activity, increases the burden of debt 
repayment for all agents involved. Under floating, there may be no interest rate hikes if the 
central bank allows the domestic currency to give in to the depreciate pressure, but if this 
pressure is large enough, the interest rates may be kept above the level that is consistent with 
the price stability objective. As a result, the burden of debt repayment – especially of foreign-
currency denominated debt – increases markedly, similarly as in the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Moreover, regardless of the exchange rate regime, a sudden stop is usually followed 
by a reversal in asset prices and thus a decline in their collateral value. Both factors (higher 
debt repayment burden and lower collateral value of assets) negatively affect agents’ balance 
sheets, leading to a worsening of banks’ portfolio and tensions in the domestic banking 
system and causing banks to curb the credit supply. If sovereign debt is also affected by the 
interest rate increases or domestic currency depreciation, the government may need to tighten 
fiscal policy. As a consequence of all these developments, aggregate demand and GDP 
growth collapse and the boom turns to a bust. In the worst case scenario, a sudden stop may 
lead to a fully-fledged financial crisis: a banking, currency or debt crisis. 
The  real interest rate channel in a heterogeneous monetary union offers another 
explanation for the emergence of boom-bust cycles (Brzoza-Brzezina et al. 2010; Torój 2009; 
Landmann 2011). Walters (1994) was among the first to point out that common monetary 
policy in the prospective Economic and Monetary Union can prove to be procyclical in the 
case of individual economies (“Walters critique”). This generally results from some sort of 
heterogeneity of the economies making up the monetary union; this heterogeneity can be 
manifested in asymmetric (i.e. country specific) shocks, low synchronisation of economic 
cycles within the union, or different levels of the natural real interest rate. 
Accordingly, a boom specific to one member state of a monetary union is initially caused by a 
positive relative output gap, which can be generated by an aggregate demand shock, a more 
favourable cyclical position compared to the rest of the union, or the accession to the 
monetary union and the related drop in the nominal and real interest rates below the 
equilibrium level
4. The resulting increase in the domestic inflation above the union’s average 
leads to a drop in the ex post real interest rates, and under adaptive inflation expectations (or 
under rational expectations in the presence of price rigidities) the same holds for the ex ante
real interest rates. This leads to another increase in the aggregate demand and output gap, 
which further fuels domestic inflation and lowers the real interest rates. As a consequence, 
                                                 
4 Importantly, the accession can produce a boom even if the natural real interest rate in the acceding country is 
equal to that in the rest of the union if domestic agents have overly optimistic expectations as to its impact on 
future incomes (Calmfors et al. 2007). This factor arguably played a role in the accession booms of some euro 
area countries, most notably Portugal. 
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nominal wages accelerate, contributing to higher unit labour costs and real exchange rate 
appreciation. The resulting decline in the trade balance brings about a gradual worsening of 
the situation in the export sector, while the domestic demand continues to expand. At some 
point employment in the export sector starts declining, which contributes to a lowering of the 
domestic demand and the unwinding of the imbalances that have accumulated. Because such 
country-specific macroeconomic booms are often accompanied by rapidly rising domestic 
asset prices and capital inflows from abroad, the economic slowdown may turn to a severe 
bust when it is accompanied by collapsing asset prices and a reversal of foreign capital flows. 
In other words, in a heterogeneous monetary union the real interest rate channel plays the role 
of an “automatic destabiliser”; the “rotating slumps under the euro” (a term coined by 
Blanchard 2007b) are a good empirical example. 
Finally, the mechanisms just described can be set in motion whenever the macroeconomic 
policy mix is inadequate to the cyclical position of an economy and the level of the natural 
real interest rate – in a monetary union and under independent monetary policy alike. In this 
respect, overly expansionary fiscal policy is often the culprit and so the literature explicitly 
points to the fiscal channel as a separate channel generating booms and busts. All in all, it is 
worth stressing that regardless of which specific mechanisms initially led to a boom, inflation 
inertia play an important role in fuelling boom-bust cycles (Blanchard 2007a; Landmann 
2011). 
4 Identification of booms and busts 
As a first step of our empirical analysis, we identify periods of booms and busts in the time 
series of private consumption and private investment in the “old” EU member states. In other 
words, we decide whether the values of the underlying series in any given year represent 
“normal” developments or booms/busts. We do that in line with the existing literature where 
three methods seem to dominate: (1) a method concentrating on deviations of the series from 
their trend, (2) an approach based on moving averages of detrended series, (3) the so-called 
triangular approach taking into account both the magnitude and the duration of expansionary/ 
recessionary episodes. 
Method (1) was adopted to analyse credit booms by, among others, Gourinchas et al. (2001), 
Cottarelli et al. (2005), IMF (2004), and Mendoza and Terrones (2008). In line with this 
approach, a boom/bust is identified if the value of the analysed time series deviates from trend 
by more than  standard deviations (e.g.   1.5) or by more than  percent (e.g.   10). 
Empirical studies focusing on credit or asset markets often adopt the threshold of   1.75 as 
it has a useful interpretation: if the deviations from trend were normally distributed, there 
would be an approx. 5 percent probability of observing extreme values (i.e. values falling 
outside the interval defined by trend ± 1.75 standard deviations). We use a lower threshold of 
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  1.3 which, under the normality assumption, points to an expected fraction of boom/bust 
episodes of almost 10 percent. For reasons explained below, and in contrast to several studies, 
we compute the threshold using country-specific standard deviations and not those computed 
based on the entire dataset. As in many other papers, the trend is approximated by means of 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter set at 1000, i.e. higher than typical 
for annual data, separately for each country. 
Method (2), in turn, was employed by Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Kakes and Ullersma (2003), 
and IMF (2009) to analyse booms and busts in asset markets. It compares moving averages of 
the growth rates of the analysed series with their historical first and second moments. 
Specifically, there is a boom in the underlying series in country  in year  if the following 
inequality holds: 

,... ,    ̅ ,                 (1) 
where  is the growth rate of the given variable in country  in year , ̅ is the average 
growth rate of that variable in country ,  is the standard deviation of the growth rates in that 
country, and  is a constant. A bust, in turn, is identified if: 

,... ,    ̅ .                 (2) 
It is again worth noting that in other studies the first and second moments are not country-
specific but they are computed for the entire sample. In line with Bordo and Jeanne (2002), 
we use three-year moving averages and – consistently with method (1) – a threshold of 
  1.3. We approximate the growth rates with the first differences of log indexes
5. 
Finally, method (3) was proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002) as a method of analysing the 
business cycle in terms of the turning points, and subsequently used by Jaeger and 
Schuknecht (2007) and by Agnello and Schuknecht (2009) to study booms and busts in asset 
and housing prices. The identification of booms and busts consists of the following steps (see 
Figure 1 below): 
(i) detrend the underlying time series; 
(ii) identify the turning points (peaks and troughs) in the detrended series; 
(iii) compute the duration () of each phase of increase or expansion (from trough to peak) 
and decline or contraction (from peak to trough) in the detrended series; 
(iv) compute the total change or amplitude () of the detrended series for each phase of 
expansion/contraction;  
(v) compute the cumulated increase/decline in the detrended series during each phase by 
means of a triangular approximation (hence the name of the method): 0.5    ; 
                                                 
5 Admittedly, this may lead to a flattening of the growth rates but is generally consistent with the empirical 
literature. 
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5 Admittedly, this may lead to a flattening of the growth rates but is generally consistent with the empirical 
literature. 
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(vi) identify booms and busts as the episodes with the largest cumulated increase/decline in 
the sample period in the given country (or, as in other studies, in the entire dataset). 
Specifically, we assume that the boom/bust years are the two to six years with the 
distinctly largest cumulated increase/decline in a country’s sample history. 
    Figure 1: An illustration of the triangular approach 
      Source: based on Agnello and Schuknecht (2009), p. 13. 
To sum up, both the first and the second method identify a boom/bust if – respectively – the 
detrended value of a series or a moving average of the growth rates falls outside an interval 
defined as the average plus/minus  standard deviations. Advocates of approach (1) argue that 
it allows to formally discriminate between changes in economic variables which reflect 
economic growth (i.e. trend), “normal” cyclical upturns and downturns (i.e. detrended values 
falling inside the defined interval), and periods of excessive growth or larger than usual 
decline (i.e. booms or busts). The downside is that the results are generally sensitive to the 
choice of the detrending procedure. Approach (2) has the following advantages: “[it] is 
objective, easily reproducible, and can be applied consistently across countries” (IMF 2009, 
p. 94). The results, however, may also depend upon the time horizon over which the moving 
averages are calculated. A disadvantage of both methods is that they are sensitive to outliers: 
one exceptionally strong boom/bust may bias the standard deviation upwards and as a result, 
some booms/busts might not be identified as such. 
As regards the triangular approach, it is worth stressing that it attaches a relatively large 
importance to the duration, not only the magnitude, of an expansion/contraction episode. The 
rationale behind this is the proposition that long-lasting changes of the cyclical component of 
a series are more probable to alter agents’ behaviour patterns than changes of the same total 
magnitude which last for a shorter period of time. A criticism to think of is that a period of 
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persisting for, say, two decades could be identified as a boom and thus treated on a par with a 
much shorter period of very steep increase; this may appear contrary to the economic 
intuition. However, such a situation seems to be a hypothetical rather than a real problem: if a 
cyclical component of a series increases year after year for two decades, it is very probable 
that at least a part of those increases represents the trend, i.e. that the trend itself, and thus the 
cyclical component, were not identified properly in the first place. In any case, no “great 
moderation” was found in our dataset. Another shortcoming of this method is that it might not 
identify a boom/bust properly if a long-lasting expansion/contraction is interrupted by a very 
short period of decline/increase in the detrended series – rather, the two expansion/contraction 
periods are treated as two separate phases of a cycle. To circumvent this shortcoming, one can 
apply an additional ad-hoc identification rule, e.g. one stating that two episodes of 
expansion/contraction interrupted by a phase of contraction/expansion lasting for only one 
period should be treated as one episode
6. 
We applied the three methods discussed above to the time series for private consumption and 
private investment in fourteen “old” EU member states, i.e. those countries which were 
members of the EU prior to its enlargement of 2004, except for Luxembourg. We will 
henceforth refer to those countries as EU-14. The reasons for which we did not include 
Luxembourg were mainly related to the availability of data
7, but the country’s very small size 
and some related characteristics also played a role. The data are annual, cover the period from 
1970 to 2009 and were taken from the AMECO database (see the discussion in Section 5.2 
regarding the choice of the sample period as well as Table 1 in that section). 
As already mentioned, an important point to underline is that we identify booms and busts 
separately for each country: in methods (1) and (2), we use country-specific means and 
standard deviations, and in method (3) we look for the episodes with the largest positive or 
negative amplitudes in a given country’s history. This stands in contrast to many other studies 
which use means and standard deviations computed for all countries together, and search for 
the largest cumulated increases or decreases in the entire set of countries. We adopted this 
country-specific approach because it is more in line with the goal of our empirical analysis, 
which is to identify the factors explaining those expansions or contractions that are unusually 
large for a given country. The dominant approach, in turn, would be better suited to address 
the question as to what makes a country unusually volatile in terms of economic activity. 
The booms and busts identified with the help of all three methods are presented in Table A.1 
in the Appendix. As Bordo and Jeanne (2002, p. 8) note, “A good criterion should be simple, 
objective and yield plausible results. In particular, it should select the notorious boom-bust 
                                                 
6 We only used such a rule in the case of one series, namely the consumption series for Austria, which included 
several one-year-long expansions and contractions. 
7 Among other things, only private consumption but not private investment data were available, and many time 
series representing the explanatory variables (see Section 5.2) were shorter than for the other countries. 
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episodes (…) without producing (too many) spurious episodes.” As can be seen from the 
table, our methods generally pass this test: they correctly identify the German reunification 
boom, the booms in EU periphery around the turn of centuries, the strong expansions in many 
countries at the beginning of the sample, and on the other hand, the severe busts in the Nordic 
countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the recent busts following from the 
global financial crisis. Nevertheless, there are still noticeable differences across methods so 
we believe that it can be insightful to run our panel regressions separately on each of the 
differently computed boom/bust series. 
5 Empirical analysis 
5.1 Econometric methodology 
In the second step of our analysis, we aim at identifying those factors which significantly 
contributed to the emergence of booms and busts in EU-14. This can be achieved by means of 
panel binary choice models defined as follows: 

∗  






                   (4) 
In the above equations, 
∗ is an unobservable dependent variable (e.g. the propensity of a 
country to have an investment boom),  the observed binary outcome (e.g. taking on the 
value 1 when there was an investment boom in country  in time period  and 0 otherwise), 
 is a vector of explanatory variables which can be time-varying or time-invariant (see 
below),  is a vector of coefficients,  is an unobserved individual-specific effect, and  is a 
random error. 1,2,…, denote the cross-sectional individuals or units (countries in our 
case) and 1,2,…, denote the time periods over which those units were observed. 
The two most commonly used binary choice frameworks are the logit and the probit models 
(Greene 2003). They are based on different assumptions regarding the distribution of the error 
term . In the logit model,  has the logistic distribution: 





  Λ 
 ,                  (5) 
where Λ denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function and  stands for probability. In 
turn, in the probit model the error term is normally distributed: 




 ,                 (6) 
where ϕ and Φ are respectively the density and the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution.  Empirical analysis
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In the context of panel data, another important difference is that the probit model is estimated 
assuming random individual-specific effects, which means that  are not fixed but have a 
distribution whose parameters can be estimated. Equation (3) can then be rewritten as follows: 

∗  
  ,                     (7) 
where  is a new “composite” error term:
    .                    (8) 
The probit model is based on a relatively strict assumption that the individual effects  are 
independent from the explanatory variables  – in other words, the unobserved () and the 
observed or structural () sources of individual heterogeneity are independent. By contrast, 
the logit model usually assumes fixed individual effects, i.e.  are treated as estimable 
parameters (individual-specific constants). In turn, when  are equal for all individuals 
(   holds for all , i.e. there is no unobserved individual heterogeneity), we obtain the 
pooled or population-averaged model, which treats the sample as one large cross-section. 
The advantage of the logit over the probit approach is that no assumptions need to be made 
regarding the distribution of the individual effects or their independence from the explanatory 
variables. However, the logit model does not allow to use all the information contained in the 
data: those explanatory variables which are time-invariant (in the sense of having a constant 
value throughout the entire sample period) for a given individual cannot be used in the 
estimation
8, and the same holds for the individuals in whose case the dependent variable 
has the same value (0 or 1) throughout the sample period
9. 
Moreover, and more importantly, a consistently estimated logit model would not allow us to 
compute the expected probability of a boom or bust happening in country  in time period . 
This becomes apparent when we note the following: 
 1   
∗ 0     
   1
    
  , (9) 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the error term ; the last equality makes 
use of the fact that the density function of the error term is symmetric in the case of both the 
logistic and the normal distribution. Evidently, in order to calculate the expected probability 
of the variable  taking on the value 1, we need to compute the estimated (theoretical) value 
of . In the case of the logit model, this is not feasible because the individual effects cancel 
out in the estimation – they are removed by the “within” transformation necessary to obtain 
consistent maximum likelihood estimates. By contrast, in the probit model the individual 
                                                 
8  This restriction means that if we used the fixed effects logit approach, most of the explanatory dummy 
variables that we have come up with (see Table 1 in Section 5.2) could not be employed as almost all of them 
take on a constant value for at least one country in the sample. 
9 At first glance, it seems that there are only two such cases in our dataset: no consumption boom in Finland and 
no investment boom in Sweden were identified with the help of method (2) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Our 
panel is unbalanced, however, and it happens that several specifications do not take account of the time periods 
in which some countries experienced all their booms or busts. Those countries would have to be dropped from 
the panel if we were to estimate the fixed effects logit model. Empirical analysis
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effects  are part of the error term  with zero expected value, so we can assume that 
  0  and compute the probability of interest. This is an important advantage of the probit 
approach given that, in the third step of our analysis, we want to compute the probabilities of 
a boom or bust in Poland based on the models estimated for EU-14. For all the above-stated 
reasons, we would rather base our estimations on the probit than the logit or the pooled 
model, provided that specification tests confirm that this is indeed the correct approach. To 
this end, after estimating each specification we run the Hausman (1978) test, which should 
allow us to choose between the probit and the logit model, and a likelihood ratio test aimed at 
comparing the random effects probit model with the pooled one (see below). 
Our models are estimated by means of the maximum likelihood method
10 where each of the 
 observations is treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution. In the model with 
success probability X
 β and independent observations, the joint probability or likelihood 
function has the following general form: 
  ,   ,…,   |  ∏ 1
   ∏ 
   	,    (10) 
where   denotes the specific observed value of . The likelihood function for the entire 
sample of  observations can be written as 





 	.         (11) 
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model can be replaced by its pooled (population-averaged) version. The alternative hypothesis 
                                                 
10 The exposition below follows Greene (2003, pp. 670-671). 
16 
effects  are part of the error term  with zero expected value, so we can assume that 
  0  and compute the probability of interest. This is an important advantage of the probit 
approach given that, in the third step of our analysis, we want to compute the probabilities of 
a boom or bust in Poland based on the models estimated for EU-14. For all the above-stated 
reasons, we would rather base our estimations on the probit than the logit or the pooled 
model, provided that specification tests confirm that this is indeed the correct approach. To 
this end, after estimating each specification we run the Hausman (1978) test, which should 
allow us to choose between the probit and the logit model, and a likelihood ratio test aimed at 
comparing the random effects probit model with the pooled one (see below). 
Our models are estimated by means of the maximum likelihood method
10 where each of the 
 observations is treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution. In the model with 
success probability X
 β and independent observations, the joint probability or likelihood 
function has the following general form: 
  ,   ,…,   |  ∏ 1
   ∏ 
   	,    (10) 
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In the context of panel data, another important difference is that the probit model is estimated 
assuming random individual-specific effects, which means that  are not fixed but have a 
distribution whose parameters can be estimated. Equation (3) can then be rewritten as follows: 
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8, and the same holds for the individuals in whose case the dependent variable 
has the same value (0 or 1) throughout the sample period
9. 
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consistent maximum likelihood estimates. By contrast, in the probit model the individual 
                                                 
8  This restriction means that if we used the fixed effects logit approach, most of the explanatory dummy 
variables that we have come up with (see Table 1 in Section 5.2) could not be employed as almost all of them 
take on a constant value for at least one country in the sample. 
9 At first glance, it seems that there are only two such cases in our dataset: no consumption boom in Finland and 
no investment boom in Sweden were identified with the help of method (2) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Our 
panel is unbalanced, however, and it happens that several specifications do not take account of the time periods 
in which some countries experienced all their booms or busts. Those countries would have to be dropped from 
the panel if we were to estimate the fixed effects logit model. Empirical analysis
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states that  is larger than zero and so the random effects need to be included in the model. 
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where   is the value of the likelihood function evaluated at the constrained estimate of the 
parameters of interest (in this case the parameters of the pooled model, which is based on the 
restriction  0 ), and   is the value of the likelihood function evaluated at the 
unconstrained estimate (in this case the parameters of the probit model with random effects). 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
Based on the boom and bust series identified in Section 4, we construct twelve different 
binary variables which are to be explained by our panel probit regressions: three representing 
booms in private consumption (boom_c1, boom_c2, boom_c3), three representing booms in 
private investment (boom_i1, boom_i2, boom_i3), three standing for busts in consumption 
(bust_c1, bust_c2, bust_c3), and three standing for busts in investment (bust_i1, bust_i2, 
bust_i3). The indices 1, 2, 3 denote the method used to identify booms and busts. 
While choosing the variables to be used in our panel regressions explaining boom and bust 
episodes in EU-14, we had the following considerations in mind. Firstly, the explanatory 
variables should have a theoretical foundation, i.e. correspond to the boom-bust transmission 
channels discussed in Section 3. Secondly, because consumption and investment are flow 
variables, the same should also hold for the regressors. Thirdly, the explanatory variables 
should be stationary. Fourthly, endogeneity of the regressors may be an issue. Last but not 
least, the time series representing the explanatory variables should be available for all EU-14 
countries for a considerably long period of time (optimally they should cover several 
economic cycles); on the other hand, the sample period should ideally not include very 
serious regime shifts. 
The data availability became the most serious constraint of our analysis. When choosing the 
sample period, we were faced with the following trade-off: we could either opt for annual data 
covering up to five decades (and thus several economic cycles), or for quarterly data covering 
a much shorter time span (and thus describing a world that was more homogeneous in terms 
of economic structures and policy regimes). We chose the former option because we believe 
that booms and busts are best identified when a sufficient number of economic upturns and 
downturns have been analysed. After a careful consideration we chose the years 1970 to 2009 
as our sample period. Even though we tried to find time series covering the entire sample 
period, it was not always possible and so our panel is unbalanced. 
As regards the issue of regressor endogeneity, we believe to have resolved it by taking lagged 
values of all variables (except for the dummies and the variable gdp_corr, see below), which Empirical analysis
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states that  is larger than zero and so the random effects need to be included in the model. 
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is common in the empirical literature. An alternative would be to use the instrumental variable 
approach; however, it is difficult to find good instruments for our regressors other than their 
own lagged values
11. To determine whether the time series are stationary, we ran panel unit 
root tests of Hadri (2000) and Breitung (2000) on those series that are strongly balanced. For 
the unbalanced series, we used the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test as well as 
Fisher-type panel unit root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and by Choi (2001). 
Below we only present those variables for which none of the tests pointed to unit roots
12. 
As a result, we came up with the set of potential regressors presented in Table 1 at the end of 
this section. In the following, we will briefly discuss the rationale behind the use of the 
specific variables and, in cases where it does not follow directly from the theoretical analysis 
in Section 3, the expected sign of the regression coefficient (shown in the last column of the 
table). We start with those variables which correspond to the financial accelerator mechanism: 
• Because this mechanism is set in motion by changes in financial asset or property prices, 
variables capturing those prices could be very useful. However, we could not find suitable 
time series of sufficient length; e.g. the property price statistics published by the Bank for 
International Settlements start in the 1990s for most EU countries, and it is hard to find 
comparable financial market indices on a country level which reach back to the 1970s. 
• Because the financial accelerator works through the credit market, variables representing 
credit developments are potentially important. The variables real_credit and credit_gdp
are two alternative proxies which are often used in empirical studies of (credit) boom-bust 
cycles
13. The former variable has the advantage that, unlike the latter, it allows for the 
possibility that credit and output might have different trends (Mendoza and Terrones 
2008) and thus it should not underestimate the scale of credit expansion or contraction 
during macroeconomic booms or busts. 
• The variable w_build is also relevant because boom-bust cycles generated through this 
channel often involve an acceleration of wages in the building and construction sector 
over and above the pace prevailing in the tradable goods sector. 
Regarding the channel of international capital flows, we consider the following regressors: 
• The variables portf_inv and fdi are the ones that capture the most relevant types of capital 
inflows. “Other investment”, a residual category on the financial account of the balance of 
payments, could also be useful given that it includes loans from abroad (e.g. from parent 
companies or foreign banks). Alternatively, we could use the net inflows on the entire 
                                                 
11 As a sensitivity check, we conducted the analysis based on transformed regressors, namely moving averages 
of their values in the years t – 1 and t – 2. It turned out that most of the transformed regressors were statistically 
insignificant in the majority of the specifications. 
12 The results of those tests are not reported here to save space but, as any other results, they are available from 
the author upon request. 
13 Strictly speaking, the available credit data in nominal terms are not flow but stock variables, but – in line e.g. 
with Gourinchas et al. (2001) or Cottarelli et al. (2005) – we circumvent this problem by taking geometric means 
of end-of-year stocks. 
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financial account, taking into consideration that specific types of capital flows were 
subject to different classification rules throughout our sample period. However, we were 
unable to find suitable time series reaching back to the 1970s. 
• As this channel might have become significant only after the capital account liberalisation 
in a given country, variables capturing this process should also be introduced. One 
potential regressor is kaopen, the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008), based 
on countries’ classifications published by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Another is the dummy variable lib
which we constructed based on the information contained in Bakker and Chapple (2002) 
and – in the case of Greece – in various volumes of the AREAER. We use this dummy 
both individually and in interaction with (i.e. multiplied by) the variables portf_inv and 
fdi. 
• Because foreign capital inflows into the banking system are an important driving force of 
boom-bust cycles, the variable for_liab and for_liab_nb also seem relevant. 
• The variable forex_loans can be useful because foreign capital inflows fuelling boom-
bust cycles often contribute to the expansion of foreign currency denominated bank loans 
to the non-bank sector. 
With regard to the real interest rate channel in a heterogeneous monetary union, the following 
regressors come into question: 
• As boom-bust cycles in a monetary union often result from country specific shocks or low 
synchronisation of economic cycles, we need variables which capture this sort of 
heterogeneity. The variables gdp_corr and u_gap are considered as candidates because 
they proxy the cyclical position of a country relative to EU-15 (i.e. EU-14 along with 
Luxembourg) and Germany. In addition, they can be regarded as proxies for the shock 
symmetry, too, because stochastic shocks, which are unobserved variables, can only be 
identified based on their impact on observable variables. We refrain from using regressors 
which directly measure the degree of shock synchronisation since any such measures are 
heavily sensitive to the methodology used to identify the shocks themselves. 
• Because boom-bust cycles in a monetary union can result from differing levels of the 
natural real interest rate in individual economies, we should ideally use this variable as a 
regressor. However, estimates of the natural rate for the countries in our sample can differ 
substantially across authors and methods, and we could not find any suitable time series 
covering our sample period. As an imperfect substitute, we take the dummy variables 
conv and rich, defined so as to single out, respectively, converging and rich economies
14; 
the former tend to be characterised by a higher and the latter by a lower level of the 
natural real interest rate. We believe that converging economies should be more prone to 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that, due to data availability, the GDP per capita is measured relative to EU-15 and not  
EU-14. For the same reason EU-15 is also the reference point in the case of the variable reer_ulc (see Table A.1). 
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is common in the empirical literature. An alternative would be to use the instrumental variable 
approach; however, it is difficult to find good instruments for our regressors other than their 
own lagged values
11. To determine whether the time series are stationary, we ran panel unit 
root tests of Hadri (2000) and Breitung (2000) on those series that are strongly balanced. For 
the unbalanced series, we used the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test as well as 
Fisher-type panel unit root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and by Choi (2001). 
Below we only present those variables for which none of the tests pointed to unit roots
12. 
As a result, we came up with the set of potential regressors presented in Table 1 at the end of 
this section. In the following, we will briefly discuss the rationale behind the use of the 
specific variables and, in cases where it does not follow directly from the theoretical analysis 
in Section 3, the expected sign of the regression coefficient (shown in the last column of the 
table). We start with those variables which correspond to the financial accelerator mechanism: 
• Because this mechanism is set in motion by changes in financial asset or property prices, 
variables capturing those prices could be very useful. However, we could not find suitable 
time series of sufficient length; e.g. the property price statistics published by the Bank for 
International Settlements start in the 1990s for most EU countries, and it is hard to find 
comparable financial market indices on a country level which reach back to the 1970s. 
• Because the financial accelerator works through the credit market, variables representing 
credit developments are potentially important. The variables real_credit and credit_gdp
are two alternative proxies which are often used in empirical studies of (credit) boom-bust 
cycles
13. The former variable has the advantage that, unlike the latter, it allows for the 
possibility that credit and output might have different trends (Mendoza and Terrones 
2008) and thus it should not underestimate the scale of credit expansion or contraction 
during macroeconomic booms or busts. 
• The variable w_build is also relevant because boom-bust cycles generated through this 
channel often involve an acceleration of wages in the building and construction sector 
over and above the pace prevailing in the tradable goods sector. 
Regarding the channel of international capital flows, we consider the following regressors: 
• The variables portf_inv and fdi are the ones that capture the most relevant types of capital 
inflows. “Other investment”, a residual category on the financial account of the balance of 
payments, could also be useful given that it includes loans from abroad (e.g. from parent 
companies or foreign banks). Alternatively, we could use the net inflows on the entire 
                                                 
11 As a sensitivity check, we conducted the analysis based on transformed regressors, namely moving averages 
of their values in the years t – 1 and t – 2. It turned out that most of the transformed regressors were statistically 
insignificant in the majority of the specifications. 
12 The results of those tests are not reported here to save space but, as any other results, they are available from 
the author upon request. 
13 Strictly speaking, the available credit data in nominal terms are not flow but stock variables, but – in line e.g. 
with Gourinchas et al. (2001) or Cottarelli et al. (2005) – we circumvent this problem by taking geometric means 
of end-of-year stocks. 
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financial account, taking into consideration that specific types of capital flows were 
subject to different classification rules throughout our sample period. However, we were 
unable to find suitable time series reaching back to the 1970s. 
• As this channel might have become significant only after the capital account liberalisation 
in a given country, variables capturing this process should also be introduced. One 
potential regressor is kaopen, the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008), based 
on countries’ classifications published by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Another is the dummy variable lib
which we constructed based on the information contained in Bakker and Chapple (2002) 
and – in the case of Greece – in various volumes of the AREAER. We use this dummy 
both individually and in interaction with (i.e. multiplied by) the variables portf_inv and 
fdi. 
• Because foreign capital inflows into the banking system are an important driving force of 
boom-bust cycles, the variable for_liab and for_liab_nb also seem relevant. 
• The variable forex_loans can be useful because foreign capital inflows fuelling boom-
bust cycles often contribute to the expansion of foreign currency denominated bank loans 
to the non-bank sector. 
With regard to the real interest rate channel in a heterogeneous monetary union, the following 
regressors come into question: 
• As boom-bust cycles in a monetary union often result from country specific shocks or low 
synchronisation of economic cycles, we need variables which capture this sort of 
heterogeneity. The variables gdp_corr and u_gap are considered as candidates because 
they proxy the cyclical position of a country relative to EU-15 (i.e. EU-14 along with 
Luxembourg) and Germany. In addition, they can be regarded as proxies for the shock 
symmetry, too, because stochastic shocks, which are unobserved variables, can only be 
identified based on their impact on observable variables. We refrain from using regressors 
which directly measure the degree of shock synchronisation since any such measures are 
heavily sensitive to the methodology used to identify the shocks themselves. 
• Because boom-bust cycles in a monetary union can result from differing levels of the 
natural real interest rate in individual economies, we should ideally use this variable as a 
regressor. However, estimates of the natural rate for the countries in our sample can differ 
substantially across authors and methods, and we could not find any suitable time series 
covering our sample period. As an imperfect substitute, we take the dummy variables 
conv and rich, defined so as to single out, respectively, converging and rich economies
14; 
the former tend to be characterised by a higher and the latter by a lower level of the 
natural real interest rate. We believe that converging economies should be more prone to 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that, due to data availability, the GDP per capita is measured relative to EU-15 and not  
EU-14. For the same reason EU-15 is also the reference point in the case of the variable reer_ulc (see Table A.1). 
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both booms and busts and so the coefficient should be positive in both cases. The variable 
i_spread can be regarded as another measure of this sort of heterogeneity as it proxies the 
credibility of a country’s macroeconomic policy mix in comparison with Germany (which 
arguably had the most credible policy mix in the EC/EU throughout most of our sample 
period)
15. We expect that less credible countries should be more susceptible to boom-bust 
cycles and so the coefficient should be negative in boom and bust regressions alike.  
• As booms in a monetary union are often associated with a worsening of an economy’s 
competitiveness relative to other members and real exchange rate appreciation (and the 
reverse holds for busts), the variable reer_ulc may also be relevant. 
• We also use the following dummy variables: (i) ec1/ec2, (ii) erm1/erm2, (iii) eur1/eur2,
representing the participation in/the accession to (i) the European Communities (EC) or 
the EU, (ii) the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System or 
the ERM  II,  and (iii) the euro area. The dummies are introduced both as stand-alone 
variables and in interaction terms, i.e. multiplied by other explanatory variables. Using 
interaction terms should help us determine whether any of the explanatory variables had a 
different impact on the probability of a boom/bust under different regimes. We do not 
formulate a priori hypotheses regarding the coefficient sign of the dummies when these 
are used individually but rather, we would like to know whether the monetary integration 
as such affected the probability of booms and busts. 
Further, we consider one regressor representing the fiscal channel: 
• The variable gov_exp is based on the cyclically adjusted total expenditure of the general 
government and we believe that its significant positive/negative impact on the probability 
of booms/busts would point to the relevance of this channel. 
Finally, we include some additional variables: 
• As domestic demand booms often concentrate in the non-tradable goods sector, i.e. (apart 
from building and construction) in the services sector, the variable w_serv can also be 
considered. 
• The dummy variables crisis and erm_crisis may prove significant because banking or 
currency crises should lower the probability of a boom and increase that of a bust. The 
opposite holds for the dummy variable reunif, representing Germany’s reunification. 
• It might also be insightful to analyse whether the degree of exchange rate stability or of 
monetary policy independence, as measured by the indices of Aizenmann, Chinn and Ito 
(2008) (the variables ers and mi), exert any significant impact on the probability of booms 
and busts. Similarly as in the case of the dummies representing monetary integration, we 
do not hypothesise the sign of the respective coefficients. 
                                                 
15 Unavoidably, this variable also depends on the degree of an economy’s synchronisation with Germany in 
terms of economic cycles and asymmetric shocks, but we were not able to come up with a variable which would 
only measure the policy credibility. 
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covering our sample period. As an imperfect substitute, we take the dummy variables 
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the former tend to be characterised by a higher and the latter by a lower level of the 
natural real interest rate. We believe that converging economies should be more prone to 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that, due to data availability, the GDP per capita is measured relative to EU-15 and not  
EU-14. For the same reason EU-15 is also the reference point in the case of the variable reer_ulc (see Table A.1). Empirical analysis
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Table 1: Variables used in the panel regressions 
Code of the 






Binary variables representing booms and busts in private 
consumption and private investment, constructed with the 
help of method (1) detailed in Section 4 (the series are 







Binary variables representing booms and busts in private 
consumption and private investment, constructed with the 
help of method (2) detailed in Section 4 (the series are 







Binary variables representing booms and busts in private 
consumption and private investment, constructed with the 
help of method (3) detailed in Section 4 (the series are 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix) 
AMECO, author’s 
calculations 
Explanatory variables representing the financial accelerator mechanism 
real_credit  The rate of change*** in domestic credit (claims on private 
sector) in constant prices, deflated with GDP deflator; credit 
data are geometric means of end-of-year stocks 
IMF IFS (credit data), 
AMECO (GDP deflator)
 + 
credit_gdp  The change in the ratio of domestic credit (claims on private 
sector) to GDP in current prices; credit data are geometric 
means of end-of-year stocks 
IMF IFS (credit data), 
AMECO (GDP) 
 + 
w_build  The rate of change in nominal unit wage costs in the 
building and construction sector relative to nominal unit 
wage costs in the manufacturing industry 
AMECO   + 
Explanatory variables representing the channel of international capital flows 
portf_inv  The change in the ratio of portfolio equity investment (net 
inflows) to GDP in current prices 
World Bank WDI   + 
fdi  The change in the ratio of foreign direct investment (net 
inflows) to GDP in current prices 
World Bank WDI   + 
kaopen  The Chinn-Ito financial openness index (an increase in the 
index means an increase in the degree of de iure financial 
openness) 




lib  Dummy variable representing the liberalisation of financial 
account transactions, taking on the value 1 starting from the 
year in which significant progress in this respect was made 
by the country in question (details are available from the 
author upon request) 
Information in Bakker 
and Chapple (2002); for 
Greece: various volumes 
of the IMF’s AREAER 
 + 
for_liab  The change in the ratio of BIS reporting banks’ external 
liabilities vis-á-vis all sectors of a given country to that 
country’s GDP 
BIS Locational Statistics 
(banking data), World 
Bank WDI (GDP) 
 + 
for_liab_nb  The change in the ratio of BIS reporting banks’ external 
liabilities vis-á-vis the non-bank sector of a given country to 
that country’s GDP 
BIS Locational Statistics 
(banking data), World 
Bank WDI (GDP) 
 + 
forex_loans  The change in the ratio of banks’ local assets in foreign 
currency vis-á-vis the non-bank sector to GDP in current 
prices 
BIS Locational Statistics 
(banking data), World 
Bank WDI (GDP) 
 + 
Explanatory variables representing the real interest rate channel in a heterogeneous monetary union 
gdp_corr  Correlation coefficients of GDP growth rates in a given 
country with GDP growth rates in the rest of EU-15 (rolling 
window, years  t – 10  to  t – 1) 
AMECO   – (when 
multiplied 
by erm1 or 
eur1) Empirical analysis
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Table 1 continued 
Code of the 
variable  Short description  Data source*  Sign** 
u_gap  Deviation of the unemployment rate from NAWRU minus 
the respective deviation for Germany 
AMECO   – (when 
multiplied 
by erm1 or 
eur1) 
conv  Dummy variable “converging economy” taking on the value 
1 if a country’s average nominal GDP per head of population 
in the previous five years was not higher than 85 percent of 
that in EU-15 (EU-14 plus Luxembourg), and 0 otherwise 
AMECO (per capita 
GDP), author’s 
calculations  
 + (for 
booms and 
busts) 
rich  Dummy variable “rich economy” taking on the value 1 if a 
country’s average nominal GDP per head of population in 
the previous five years was not lower than 115 percent of 
that in EU-15 (EU-14 plus Luxembourg), and 0 otherwise 
AMECO (per capita 
GDP), author’s 
calculations 
 – (for 
booms and 
busts) 
i_spread  Spread between nominal long- and short-term interest rate 
minus the respective spread for Germany 
AMECO   – (for 
booms and 
busts) 
reer_ulc  The rate of change in the real effective exchange rate based 
on unit labour costs; positive value means appreciation 
(performance relative to the rest of the EU-15, i.e. EU-14 
plus Luxembourg) 
AMECO   + 
ec1, erm1, 
eur1 
Dummy variables “EC/EU membership”, “ERM/ERM II 
membership” and “euro area membership” (1 if the country 
is a member and 0 otherwise****) 
Author’s compilation   ? 
ec2, erm2, 
eur2 
Dummy variable “EC/EU accession”, “ERM/ERM II 
accession” and “euro area accession” (1 in the year in which 
the country accedes and 0 otherwise****) 
Author’s compilation   ? 
Explanatory variables representing the fiscal channel 
gov_exp  The change in the ratio of cyclically adjusted total 
expenditure of general government to GDP in current prices 
AMECO   + 
Other explanatory variables 
w_serv  The rate of change in nominal unit wage costs in the services 
sector relative to nominal unit wage costs in the 
manufacturing industry 
AMECO   + 
crisis  Dummy variable “banking crisis” (1 if a country experienced 
a banking crisis in a given year and 0 otherwise) 
Database in Laeven and 
Valencia (2010) 
 – 
erm_crisis  Dummy variable “ERM crisis” (1 in the years 1992 and 
1993 and 0 otherwise) 
Author’s compilation   – 
reunif  Dummy variable “reunification of Germany” (1 in 1991, 0 
otherwise) 
Author’s compilation   + 
ers, mi  The Aizenmann-Chinn-Ito exchange rate stability and 
monetary independence indices; an increase in the index 
means an increase in the degree of exchange rate 
stability/monetary independence 




* AMECO = the annual macro-economic database of the European Commission; AREAER = Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; EU-15 = EU-14 along with Luxembourg; IFS = International Financial Statistics; 
WDI = World Development Indicators. 
** The expected sign of the variable’s coefficient in a regression explaining the probability of a consumption or investment 
boom; the opposite sign is expected for busts. 
*** The rates of change are approximated with the first differences of log indexes. 
**** It is assumed that EC/EU accession took place in the year in which a country signed a treaty of accession, and that the 
country joined the ERM/the euro area in the year in which green light was given to its participation. Empirical analysis
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Obviously, we cannot use all the above-discussed variables together in one regression because 
this would cause rather serious multicollinearity problems. In the case of several regressor 
couples (e.g. real_credit and credit_gdp, or for_liab and for_liab_nb), their collinearity can be 
expected from the outset – we propose them as alternative proxies of a given phenomenon or 
economic aggregate. The high pair-wise correlation coefficients confirm those expectations 
and so only one variable from each of such couples can be used in any of the regressions. For 
some other pairs of variables, the correlation is also relatively strong so we need to be careful 
when specifying the regression equations. In most cases, though, the correlation coefficients 
are insignificantly different from zero. We now turn to the results of our estimations, which 
will be presented in the next subsection. 
5.3 Results for EU-14 
We estimate separate models for each of the binary variables representing booms and busts in 
private consumption and investment identified with the help of three different methods, i.e. 
twelve panel probit models for twelve dependent variables (see the first rows of Table 1 
above). Because our explanatory variables are in many cases highly correlated and thus have 
to be used interchangeably, for each dependent variable we have come up with several subsets 
of regressors which are statistically significant, both individually (at the 10 percent level) and 
jointly (at least at the 2.5 percent level and in most cases at the 1% level), as confirmed by t 
tests and likelihood ratio tests
16. Indeed, some variables are very highly significant, which in 
some cases raises suspicions (addressed below) of spurious results. The coefficients generally 
have the expected sign, with some exceptions which we will explicitly address below. We 
believe that the relatively large number of specifications, similarly as the identification of 
booms and busts with the help of three different methods, serve the purpose of a sensitivity 
check of our results. The estimated coefficients along with the associated p-values are 
presented in Tables A.2 to A.5 in the Appendix and will be discussed shortly. 
As pointed out in Section 5.1, for each specification we need to test whether the probit model 
– which is based on the strong assumption that the individual effects  and the explanatory 
variables  are independent – is indeed the correct specification. Tables A.2 to A.5 include 
the results of the two tests discussed in Section 5.1, the Hausman (1978) and the likelihood 
ratio test. The former did not reject the null hypothesis that both the random effects probit and 
the fixed effects logit models are consistent but the probit model is efficient for any of our 
specifications, so we assume that the probit model is indeed the correct one. Regarding the 
latter test, the,null hypotheses stating that 0  (see equation (13) in Section 5.1) was only 
rejected for the models explaining booms in consumption identified by means of methods (1) 
and (2) (the series boom_c1 and boom_c2, see Table A.2), one specification explaining busts 
                                                 
16 In some cases the constant term was not significant but we kept it nevertheless. 
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– which is based on the strong assumption that the individual effects  and the explanatory 
variables  are independent – is indeed the correct specification. Tables A.2 to A.5 include 
the results of the two tests discussed in Section 5.1, the Hausman (1978) and the likelihood 
ratio test. The former did not reject the null hypothesis that both the random effects probit and 
the fixed effects logit models are consistent but the probit model is efficient for any of our 
specifications, so we assume that the probit model is indeed the correct one. Regarding the 
latter test, the,null hypotheses stating that 0  (see equation (13) in Section 5.1) was only 
rejected for the models explaining booms in consumption identified by means of methods (1) 
and (2) (the series boom_c1 and boom_c2, see Table A.2), one specification explaining busts 
                                                 
16 In some cases the constant term was not significant but we kept it nevertheless. 
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both booms and busts and so the coefficient should be positive in both cases. The variable 
i_spread can be regarded as another measure of this sort of heterogeneity as it proxies the 
credibility of a country’s macroeconomic policy mix in comparison with Germany (which 
arguably had the most credible policy mix in the EC/EU throughout most of our sample 
period)
15. We expect that less credible countries should be more susceptible to boom-bust 
cycles and so the coefficient should be negative in boom and bust regressions alike.  
• As booms in a monetary union are often associated with a worsening of an economy’s 
competitiveness relative to other members and real exchange rate appreciation (and the 
reverse holds for busts), the variable reer_ulc may also be relevant. 
• We also use the following dummy variables: (i) ec1/ec2, (ii) erm1/erm2, (iii) eur1/eur2,
representing the participation in/the accession to (i) the European Communities (EC) or 
the EU, (ii) the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System or 
the ERM  II,  and (iii) the euro area. The dummies are introduced both as stand-alone 
variables and in interaction terms, i.e. multiplied by other explanatory variables. Using 
interaction terms should help us determine whether any of the explanatory variables had a 
different impact on the probability of a boom/bust under different regimes. We do not 
formulate a priori hypotheses regarding the coefficient sign of the dummies when these 
are used individually but rather, we would like to know whether the monetary integration 
as such affected the probability of booms and busts. 
Further, we consider one regressor representing the fiscal channel: 
• The variable gov_exp is based on the cyclically adjusted total expenditure of the general 
government and we believe that its significant positive/negative impact on the probability 
of booms/busts would point to the relevance of this channel. 
Finally, we include some additional variables: 
• As domestic demand booms often concentrate in the non-tradable goods sector, i.e. (apart 
from building and construction) in the services sector, the variable w_serv can also be 
considered. 
• The dummy variables crisis and erm_crisis may prove significant because banking or 
currency crises should lower the probability of a boom and increase that of a bust. The 
opposite holds for the dummy variable reunif, representing Germany’s reunification. 
• It might also be insightful to analyse whether the degree of exchange rate stability or of 
monetary policy independence, as measured by the indices of Aizenmann, Chinn and Ito 
(2008) (the variables ers and mi), exert any significant impact on the probability of booms 
and busts. Similarly as in the case of the dummies representing monetary integration, we 
do not hypothesise the sign of the respective coefficients. 
                                                 
15 Unavoidably, this variable also depends on the degree of an economy’s synchronisation with Germany in 
terms of economic cycles and asymmetric shocks, but we were not able to come up with a variable which would 
only measure the policy credibility.  20 
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Obviously, we cannot use all the above-discussed variables together in one regression because 
this would cause rather serious multicollinearity problems. In the case of several regressor 
couples (e.g. real_credit and credit_gdp, or for_liab and for_liab_nb), their collinearity can be 
expected from the outset – we propose them as alternative proxies of a given phenomenon or 
economic aggregate. The high pair-wise correlation coefficients confirm those expectations 
and so only one variable from each of such couples can be used in any of the regressions. For 
some other pairs of variables, the correlation is also relatively strong so we need to be careful 
when specifying the regression equations. In most cases, though, the correlation coefficients 
are insignificantly different from zero. We now turn to the results of our estimations, which 
will be presented in the next subsection. 
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jointly (at least at the 2.5 percent level and in most cases at the 1% level), as confirmed by t 
tests and likelihood ratio tests
16. Indeed, some variables are very highly significant, which in 
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believe that the relatively large number of specifications, similarly as the identification of 
booms and busts with the help of three different methods, serve the purpose of a sensitivity 
check of our results. The estimated coefficients along with the associated p-values are 
presented in Tables A.2 to A.5 in the Appendix and will be discussed shortly. 
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in consumption (the series bust_c1, see Table A.4), and four specifications explaining busts in 
investment (the series bust i2, see Table A.5). Therefore, those were the only cases for which 
we employed the random effects specification, and all the other models were specified as 
pooled probit models. 
Turning to the estimation results, Tables A.2 to A.5 confirm that the financial accelerator 
mechanism is an important driving force of boom-bust cycles in EU-14. The credit variables 
are significant in all of our models, and in several cases the associated p-values are very low 
(i.e. markedly below 0.01), which in our view shows that macroeconomic booms and busts 
are to a large extent driven by changing credit conditions – a common result in the empirical 
literature. In most cases no interaction terms (i.e. no products of the credit variables with the 
dummy variables ec1, erm1 and eur1 representing the monetary integration process) were 
necessary; it is worth noting that we only introduced interactions of variables with those 
dummies if a given variable was not significant by itself. Thus, the fact that the credit 
variables do not need interaction terms means that these variables are significant throughout 
the entire sample and not only in the EC or EU/under the ERM or ERM II regime/in the euro 
area. Interestingly, it is the variable real_credit (the rate of change in the domestic credit in 
real terms) rather than the variable credit_gdp (the change in the domestic credit relative to 
GDP) that turned out to be significant in most specifications, especially those explaining 
booms and busts in investment. This reinforces the argument of Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008) that the former variable is a better proxy of credit booms because, in contrast to the 
latter, it allows for the possibility that credit and output might have different trends. 
Apparently, our results suggest that this argument is more relevant in the case of booms or 
busts in investment than those in consumption. 
Furthermore, the variable w_build (the rate of change in the wages in the building and 
construction sector relative to the manufacturing sector) turns out to be significant in several 
specifications, both by itself (above all in the models referring to consumption) and when 
interacted with the dummy eur1 standing for the participation in the euro area (especially in 
the models referring to investment). Thus, increases/decreases in the nominal wages in the 
building and construction sector relative to the manufacturing sector were followed by 
booms/busts in consumption throughout the entire sample period, and in the euro area they 
mainly fuelled investment booms/busts. 
As far as the channel of international capital flows is concerned, several interesting results 
stand out. Firstly, the variable portf_inv, capturing the inflows of portfolio investment relative 
to GDP, is significant only in about one sixth of our specifications (and in a few cases the 
coefficients are wrongly signed) but the variable fdi, capturing the inflows of foreign direct 
investment relative to GDP, shows up in more than one fourth of the specifications. More 
often than not, the two variables are only significant when interacted with the monetary 
integration dummies, usually erm1 or eur1. This means that the inflow of portfolio capital or Empirical analysis
WORKING PAPER No. 103 29
5
24 
in consumption (the series bust_c1, see Table A.4), and four specifications explaining busts in 
investment (the series bust i2, see Table A.5). Therefore, those were the only cases for which 
we employed the random effects specification, and all the other models were specified as 
pooled probit models. 
Turning to the estimation results, Tables A.2 to A.5 confirm that the financial accelerator 
mechanism is an important driving force of boom-bust cycles in EU-14. The credit variables 
are significant in all of our models, and in several cases the associated p-values are very low 
(i.e. markedly below 0.01), which in our view shows that macroeconomic booms and busts 
are to a large extent driven by changing credit conditions – a common result in the empirical 
literature. In most cases no interaction terms (i.e. no products of the credit variables with the 
dummy variables ec1, erm1 and eur1 representing the monetary integration process) were 
necessary; it is worth noting that we only introduced interactions of variables with those 
dummies if a given variable was not significant by itself. Thus, the fact that the credit 
variables do not need interaction terms means that these variables are significant throughout 
the entire sample and not only in the EC or EU/under the ERM or ERM II regime/in the euro 
area. Interestingly, it is the variable real_credit (the rate of change in the domestic credit in 
real terms) rather than the variable credit_gdp (the change in the domestic credit relative to 
GDP) that turned out to be significant in most specifications, especially those explaining 
booms and busts in investment. This reinforces the argument of Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008) that the former variable is a better proxy of credit booms because, in contrast to the 
latter, it allows for the possibility that credit and output might have different trends. 
Apparently, our results suggest that this argument is more relevant in the case of booms or 
busts in investment than those in consumption. 
Furthermore, the variable w_build (the rate of change in the wages in the building and 
construction sector relative to the manufacturing sector) turns out to be significant in several 
specifications, both by itself (above all in the models referring to consumption) and when 
interacted with the dummy eur1 standing for the participation in the euro area (especially in 
the models referring to investment). Thus, increases/decreases in the nominal wages in the 
building and construction sector relative to the manufacturing sector were followed by 
booms/busts in consumption throughout the entire sample period, and in the euro area they 
mainly fuelled investment booms/busts. 
As far as the channel of international capital flows is concerned, several interesting results 
stand out. Firstly, the variable portf_inv, capturing the inflows of portfolio investment relative 
to GDP, is significant only in about one sixth of our specifications (and in a few cases the 
coefficients are wrongly signed) but the variable fdi, capturing the inflows of foreign direct 
investment relative to GDP, shows up in more than one fourth of the specifications. More 
often than not, the two variables are only significant when interacted with the monetary 
integration dummies, usually erm1 or eur1. This means that the inflow of portfolio capital or 
25 
foreign direct investment can be regarded as one of the driving forces of boom-bust cycles in 
EU-14, but hardly a very important one. However, this relatively weak link may also be the 
result of the specific data that we could come up with: as argued in Section 5.2, foreign 
capital flows were subject to different classification rules throughout our sample period. A 
related result is that the inflow of foreign capital into the domestic banking system relative to 
GDP (the variable for_liab) is only significant in the case of busts in consumption as well as – 
when interacted with ec1 – in one specification explaining busts in investment
17; in the case 
of busts in consumption this variable is often very highly significant (again, with p-values 
markedly below 0.01). A sudden stop, it seems, strongly contributes to busts in consumption, 
but otherwise hardly any impact could be detected. 
Secondly, the change in banks’ foreign exchange denominated local assets relative to GDP 
(the variable forex_loans) shows up in more than half of our specifications, and only in about 
one third of all cases an interaction term – usually erm1, standing for the participation in the 
ERM or ERM II – was necessary. The developments of the foreign exchange denominated 
loans to GDP ratio were mainly relevant in the specifications explaining busts in investment 
(throughout the entire sample period) and booms in investment (under the ERM or ERM II 
regime), though in the latter case the coefficient is wrongly signed. Thus, it appears that 
expansions of foreign exchange denominated bank loans significantly lower the probability of 
busts in investment but, inexplicably, they also lower the probability of booms in investment; 
possibly, this is a spurious result. In the case of booms and busts in consumption, the sign of 
the coefficient is always in line with our expectations, but the variable forex_loans shows up 
in relatively few specifications. Looking at booms versus busts, many of the coefficients are 
very highly significant in the busts equations but not so in the boom equations, which in our 
view shows an asymmetric role of foreign exchange denominated loans: a credit crunch is 
more relevant for macroeconomic developments than a rapid credit expansion. 
Thirdly, the dummy variable lib, representing the capital account liberalisation, is never 
significant – either alone or when interacted with the variables portf_inv and fdi. By contrast, 
the Chinn-Ito financial openness index (the variable kaopen) is highly significant in most of 
the models explaining booms in consumption, but contrary to our expectations, the increase of 
the degree of financial openness results in a lower, not higher, probability of a boom. The 
unexpected coefficient sign along with very low p-values (0.000 in some specifications) raise 
suspicions of spurious results. A possible explanation is the following: the variable kaopen is 
upward trending as the degree of financial openness of all the economies in our sample 
increased over time, and it happens that the largest and/or longest consumption booms 
occurred at the beginning of our sample (i.e. the dependent variable is downward trending) – 
                                                 
17 The results remain unchanged when we use the variable for_liab_nb instead of for_liab. This is due to the very 
high correlation (the correlation coefficient amounting to 0.96) of the change in BIS reporting banks’ external 
liabilities vis-á-vis all sectors and the liabilities vis-á-vis the non-bank sector. 
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hence the negative coefficient. All in all, though, our results confirm the relevance of 
international capital flows as a driving force of boom-bust cycles, though the results are not as 
clear-cut as in the case of the financial accelerator channel. 
Turning to the real interest rate channel in a monetary union, the variables capturing the 
cyclical heterogeneity of countries – the correlation of GDP growth with the rest of EU-15 
(gdp_corr) as well as the deviation of the unemployment rate from NAWRU minus the same 
deviation for Germany (u_gap) – appear respectively in about one fifth and about one third of 
all specifications. The regressor u_gap is correctly signed in all cases and it is significant 
without any interaction terms only in the regressions explaining busts; when interacted with 
the monetary integration dummies, it becomes significant in boom and bust regressions alike. 
Thus, throughout the entire sample period a deterioration in a country’s cyclical position 
relative to Germany was coupled with a higher probability of a bust and, as monetary 
integration was advancing, also with a lower probability of a boom. The variable gdp_corr, in 
turn, has the wrong coefficient sign in half of the cases so its explanatory power is rather low. 
A look at the variables capturing the structural heterogeneity of countries which undergo the 
process of monetary integration reveals further interesting results. Firstly, the dummy variable 
conv denoting the converging economies is significant by itself only in a small number of 
regressions explaining consumption booms
18. In all cases its coefficient sign is contrary to our 
expectations: being a converging economy makes a country less, not more, prone to a 
consumption boom. Secondly, the interaction of the variable conv with the dummy ec1 
appears in a small number of regressions explaining booms in both consumption and 
investment, and it seems that participation in the EC or EU lowers the probability of a boom 
for both converging and non-converging economies but more strongly for the former – a 
result which also differs from what we expected.  
Thirdly, the variable i_spread (the spread between nominal long- and short-term interest rate 
minus the respective spread for Germany) appears in about a third of all models explaining 
both booms and busts in consumption and investment, and in most cases no interaction terms 
are needed. However, we included this variable as a proxy of a country’s credibility compared 
with Germany and, therefore, we believed that its coefficient should be negative for both 
booms and busts because less credible countries (i.e. those with a higher spread) should be 
more prone to both booms and busts. Nevertheless, the coefficient is negative in the boom 
regressions and positive in the bust regressions, which could suggest that the variable i_spread 
is a good measure of a country’s cyclical position relative to Germany, but not necessarily a 
good proxy of its policy credibility (see footnote 15). In any case, we believe that this variable 
is an important factor explaining booms and busts, as reflected in the often very low p-values 
of the coefficients.  
                                                 
18 By contrast, the variable rich, standing for the economies whose GDP per head of population is at least equal 
to 115 percent of that in EU-15, is never significant. 
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is an important factor explaining booms and busts, as reflected in the often very low p-values 
of the coefficients.  
                                                 
18 By contrast, the variable rich, standing for the economies whose GDP per head of population is at least equal 
to 115 percent of that in EU-15, is never significant. Empirical analysis
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hence the negative coefficient. All in all, though, our results confirm the relevance of 
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Fourthly, the dummies ec1/ec2, erm1/erm2, eur1/eur2 used as stand-alone variables are 
significant only in a very small number of specifications and their signs do not show any clear 
pattern. We thus believe that our data do not point to a significant shift in the probability of 
booms and busts resulting from the monetary integration per se. Similar remarks hold for the 
variable reer_ulc (the rate of change in the real effective exchange rate based on unit labour 
costs), which is seldom significant and often has the wrong coefficient sign. 
Turning to the fiscal channel, the change in the cyclically adjusted expenditure of the general 
government relative to GDP (the variable gov_exp) appears in more than half of the 
specifications, albeit often multiplied with the dummies erm1 or eur1. Strikingly, this is 
another variable whose coefficient sign is consequently opposite to what we expected: an 
increase in the cyclically adjusted government expenditure lowers the probability of a boom 
and increases that of a bust (especially an investment bust). The former regularity is in line 
with the results of Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2010) who show that a fiscal contraction adds to 
the consumption boom. In other words, our results mean that the fiscal channel is at work but 
it boils down to a crowding-out effect: a reduction in the general government expenditure 
“makes room” for a boom in the private expenditure, and the reverse holds for busts. 
As regards the remaining regressors, the dummy variable reunif standing for the reunification 
of Germany (lagged or non-lagged) is significant and positively signed in several regressions 
explaining booms in consumption, but not booms in investment. In turn, the dummy 
representing banking crises (the variable crisis) appears with a positive sign in a small number 
of specifications explaining consumption busts and in most of those explaining investment 
busts, which is what we could expect. The dummy erm_crisis standing for the ERM crisis of 
1992 to 1993, by contrast, is never significant. The variable w_serv (the rate of change in the 
wages in the services sector relative to the manufacturing sector) appears in about a third of 
all specifications, mainly those explaining busts, is highly significant and, interestingly, 
negatively signed in all cases except for one. In other words, an acceleration of the nominal 
wages in the services sector relative to the manufacturing sector lowers the probability of both 
a boom and a bust – a result which is rather difficult to explain. Finally, the Aizenmann-
Chinn-Ito indices of exchange rate stability and monetary independence (the variables ers and 
mi) show up only in a small number of specifications. It appears that an increase in the degree 
of monetary independence raises the probability of an investment boom, whereas a higher 
degree of exchange rate stability is coupled with a lower probability of a consumption bust. 
Because the associated p-values are suspiciously low, we think that these results might be 
somewhat spurious, similarly as in the case of the variable kaopen. Specifically, the degree of 
monetary independence decreased over time throughout our sample, whereas the degree of 
exchange rate stability increased. At the same time, it happens that many investment booms 
happened at the beginning of the sample period and many consumption busts happened at the 
end of that period. Empirical analysis
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Overall, a comparison of all the specifications reveals that our results are relatively insensitive 
to the choice of the boom/bust identification method, especially in the case of the bust 
regressions. Further, the regressions referring to consumption booms or busts generally use a 
similar set of explanatory variables as those referring to booms or busts in investment. 
5.4 Results for Poland 
The third goal of our analysis is to assess the probability of booms and busts in Poland in the 
years 2004 to 2009 based on the above-discussed models estimated for EU-14. The choice of 
the time period over which we run our forecast is restricted by the availability of the Polish 
data. We use the same data sources as in the case of EU-14, with the exceptions of the credit 
variables and the data on foreign exchange denominated loans for which we take the time 
series provided by the National Bank of Poland
19. In order to assess the impact of a rapid euro 
adoption on the probability of booms and busts in Poland, we compare the forecasts generated 
based on two different sets of assumptions. The first is the following counterfactual (the 
quick euro adoption scenario): we assume that Poland joined the ERM II immediately upon 
EU accession in 2004 and adopted the euro in 2007. The second is the real scenario in which 
Poland joined the EU in 2004 but did not join either the ERM II or the euro area until at least 
2009. 
The computation of the probabilities is straightforward for the pooled probit models; for the 
probit models with random effects, we assume that the individual effect is always equal to 
zero (see Section 5.1). The predicted probabilities for both scenarios as well as the differences 
in probabilities between the rapid euro adoption and the real scenario are presented in Tables 
A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix. At first glance, our results do not follow any pattern whatsoever 
– they vary rather strongly across the different specifications, even those using the same 
dependent variable. 
A closer look at the tables reveals some minor regularities, notably an increase in the 
probability of an investment boom in 2005 and a decrease in the probability of a consumption 
boom in the same year under the rapid euro adoption scenario compared with the real one. 
Another visible difference is a lower probability of an investment boom in 2009 in the former 
scenario. If we forecasted the value of the binary dependent variables rather than the 
probabilities of a boom or bust (i.e.   instead of  1 ), these three regularities would 
translate to differential values of the forecasted dependent variables: an investment boom 
instead of a consumption boom would be forecasted for 2005, and no investment boom would 
                                                 
19 The reason is that the IMF credit data for 2009 are missing, and the BIS data on foreign exchange loans are 
unavailable for Poland. 
By contrast, the variable rich, standing for the economies whose GDP per head of population is at least equal to 
115 percent of that in EU-15, is never significant.
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be forecasted for 2009 under the rapid euro adoption scenario compared with the real one
20. 
Moreover, there is a certain increase in the probabilities of both a consumption and an 
investment bust in 2009 under the rapid euro adoption scenario, but it is so small that they can 
be disregarded. Thus, according to our forecast the probability of a macroeconomic bust when 
the global crisis hit would not be higher if Poland participated in the euro area. 
The above-discussed results are the only ones that hold regardless of the specification used 
and so we conclude that either the models estimated for EU-14 are not adequate for Poland, or 
– which is a less probable outcome – that a rapid euro adoption would not have significantly 
affected the probability of a boom-bust cycle in Poland. 
6 Summary, conclusions, and some related caveats 
The goal of this paper has been to determine which structural characteristics of an economy 
make it more (or less) prone to macroeconomic boom-bust cycles, and to empirically assess 
the risk of such cycles in Poland after the euro adoption. In a first step, we identified booms 
and busts in private consumption and private investment in fourteen “old” EU member states 
based on three different methods. In a second step, we applied panel probit models with 
random effects as well as pooled probit models to explain the identified boom and bust series. 
In a third step, we used the models estimated for the “old” EU to assess the probability of 
booms and busts in Poland in the years 2004 to 2009 under two different scenarios: the quick 
euro adoption and the real scenario. 
Before we summarise our results and conclude, several caveats are worth addressing. The 
most important one is related to the Lucas critique, i.e. the question to what extent the 
experience of “old” EU countries during the years 1970 to 2009 is relevant for Poland once it 
joins the euro area. Similar questions always arise when it comes to formulating policy 
recommendations based on empirical analyses which, inevitably, draw on past data. However, 
in the case of this study the Lucas critique is of utmost importance due to a major structural 
break which occurred at the end of the sample: the global financial and economic crisis which 
originated in the US subprime mortgage market in 2007. The severity of the crisis led 
governments and central banks around the world to try to design policies aimed at avoiding 
such crises in the future. Similarly, the Greek debt crisis of 2009 has forced the EU authorities 
to change the rules governing the institutional setup of the euro area, and this will affect the 
functioning of individual member states within the common currency area. Without any 
doubt, the world will be very different at the time of Poland’s euro adoption than it was 
during the four decades covered by our analysis. 
                                                 
20 In line with the common rule, a boom/bust is forecasted for country i and year t if the predicted probability of 
a boom/bust is larger than the share of booms/busts in the sample, i.e. approx. 10 percent in our case. 
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At first glance, the above seems to render our results a rather useless foundation for policy 
recommendations. Nevertheless, we believe that the conclusions formulated above can at least 
shed some light on the question as to which factors tend to increase the probability of booms 
or busts. It is worth stressing that the future changes of the institutional setup might “switch 
off” some of those factors. For instance, until recently countries with relatively high natural 
real interest rates experienced a substantial decline of nominal interest rates in the run-up to 
the euro adoption. As our analysis shows, the interest rate spread against Germany has been 
one of the factors contributing to booms and busts alike. After the recent crisis, however, the 
reduction in interest rates accompanying the euro adoption process will most probably not be 
as strong as it used to be; rather, financial market participants will concentrate more on a 
country’s fundamentals instead of assuming that the euro area gives its members full 
protection against policy failures – or default, for that matter. Importantly, this change will 
dramatically affect the potential benefits of the euro adoption for converging economies 
because, as argued in the introduction, the bulk of those benefits should result from the drop 
in nominal interest rates. Only time will show how exactly the recent crisis changed the 
structure of the global economy, but this need not mean that empirical researchers should wait 
for years before they start to analyse the past and try to formulate cautious policy 
recommendations based on the outcome of their analyses. 
Also worth addressing is the question whether booms and busts of the past four decades have 
enough in common to be analysed all together within a panel framework. As a comparison, 
suffice it to say that currency crises which happened in many parts of the world during our 
sample period
21 were often triggered by different sets of factors – and they were often 
accompanied or followed by consumption and investment busts so they are to some extent 
related with our research question. Obviously, not all booms or busts are alike, and often their 
dynamics depend on unobservable factors such as agents’ differing expectations regarding 
long-term developments of important variables (see Burnside et al. 2011). Nevertheless, we 
believe that there are several factors which, under normal circumstances and in countries that 
are structurally alike at least in some ways, significantly affect the probability of booms or 
busts. Our analysis was aimed at identifying such factors, and in our opinion this aim has been 
achieved. 
Given these considerations, our results suggest that credit developments have clearly been the 
most important driving force of booms and busts in EU-14, which points to the crucial role of 
the financial accelerator mechanism. The relevance of international capital flows as a 
transmission channel is also confirmed, albeit mainly for busts rather than booms. 
Interestingly, a higher degree of financial openness is coupled with a lower, not higher, 
                                                 
21 Most notably, the “first generation” currency crises in Latin America of the 1970s and 1980s, the “second 
generation” crisis of the European Monetary System of 1992-93, and the “third generation” Asian crisis of 1997-
98, as well as the sharp depreciation of many currencies caused by the global financial meltdown of 2008. Summary, conclusions and some related caveats
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believe that there are several factors which, under normal circumstances and in countries that 
are structurally alike at least in some ways, significantly affect the probability of booms or 
busts. Our analysis was aimed at identifying such factors, and in our opinion this aim has been 
achieved. 
Given these considerations, our results suggest that credit developments have clearly been the 
most important driving force of booms and busts in EU-14, which points to the crucial role of 
the financial accelerator mechanism. The relevance of international capital flows as a 
transmission channel is also confirmed, albeit mainly for busts rather than booms. 
Interestingly, a higher degree of financial openness is coupled with a lower, not higher, 
                                                 
21 Most notably, the “first generation” currency crises in Latin America of the 1970s and 1980s, the “second 
generation” crisis of the European Monetary System of 1992-93, and the “third generation” Asian crisis of 1997-
98, as well as the sharp depreciation of many currencies caused by the global financial meltdown of 2008. 
31 
probability of a consumption boom. Variables that capture the cyclical heterogeneity of 
countries which undergo a process of monetary integration are also significant. Strikingly, 
converging economies in our sample have been less, not more, prone to consumption booms, 
and it appears that participation in the EC or EU lowers the probability of a boom for both 
converging and non-converging economies but more strongly for the former. Finally, we find 
evidence that the working of the fiscal channel is contrary to our expectations and boils down 
to a crowding-out effect: a reduction in the general government expenditure “makes room” for 
a boom in the private expenditure, and the reverse holds for busts. 
As regards the forecast for Poland, our results are rather inconclusive, which means that either 
the models estimated for EU-14 are not adequate for Poland, or – which is a less probable 
outcome – that a rapid euro adoption would not have significantly affected the probability of a 
boom-bust cycle in Poland. In any case, there are certain lessons to be drawn from the 
experience of EU-14, most notably that preventing an excessive credit expansion should be 
the main policy objective if Poland is to avoid the vicious cycle of macroeconomic booms and 
busts both in the euro area and before accession. A better cyclical alignment with the euro 
area’s core countries, such as Germany, should also contribute to a lower probability of 
booms and busts. 
30 
At first glance, the above seems to render our results a rather useless foundation for policy 
recommendations. Nevertheless, we believe that the conclusions formulated above can at least 
shed some light on the question as to which factors tend to increase the probability of booms 
or busts. It is worth stressing that the future changes of the institutional setup might “switch 
off” some of those factors. For instance, until recently countries with relatively high natural 
real interest rates experienced a substantial decline of nominal interest rates in the run-up to 
the euro adoption. As our analysis shows, the interest rate spread against Germany has been 
one of the factors contributing to booms and busts alike. After the recent crisis, however, the 
reduction in interest rates accompanying the euro adoption process will most probably not be 
as strong as it used to be; rather, financial market participants will concentrate more on a 
country’s fundamentals instead of assuming that the euro area gives its members full 
protection against policy failures – or default, for that matter. Importantly, this change will 
dramatically affect the potential benefits of the euro adoption for converging economies 
because, as argued in the introduction, the bulk of those benefits should result from the drop 
in nominal interest rates. Only time will show how exactly the recent crisis changed the 
structure of the global economy, but this need not mean that empirical researchers should wait 
for years before they start to analyse the past and try to formulate cautious policy 
recommendations based on the outcome of their analyses. 
Also worth addressing is the question whether booms and busts of the past four decades have 
enough in common to be analysed all together within a panel framework. As a comparison, 
suffice it to say that currency crises which happened in many parts of the world during our 
sample period
21 were often triggered by different sets of factors – and they were often 
accompanied or followed by consumption and investment busts so they are to some extent 
related with our research question. Obviously, not all booms or busts are alike, and often their 
dynamics depend on unobservable factors such as agents’ differing expectations regarding 
long-term developments of important variables (see Burnside et al. 2011). Nevertheless, we 
believe that there are several factors which, under normal circumstances and in countries that 
are structurally alike at least in some ways, significantly affect the probability of booms or 
busts. Our analysis was aimed at identifying such factors, and in our opinion this aim has been 
achieved. 
Given these considerations, our results suggest that credit developments have clearly been the 
most important driving force of booms and busts in EU-14, which points to the crucial role of 
the financial accelerator mechanism. The relevance of international capital flows as a 
transmission channel is also confirmed, albeit mainly for busts rather than booms. 
Interestingly, a higher degree of financial openness is coupled with a lower, not higher, 
                                                 
21 Most notably, the “first generation” currency crises in Latin America of the 1970s and 1980s, the “second 
generation” crisis of the European Monetary System of 1992-93, and the “third generation” Asian crisis of 1997-
98, as well as the sharp depreciation of many currencies caused by the global financial meltdown of 2008. References
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Boom and bust episodes identified with the help of different methods 
Country* Method (1)  Method (2)  Method (3)  Method (1)  Method (2)  Method (3) 
  Booms in private consumption  Busts in private consumption 

















1978–80, 1992, 2001 













1973, 1977–8, 1991–2 








1973, 1980, 1988–91 
1987–8, 2000 
1987–9 
1972–3, 1977, 1991–2 
1973, 1991, 2000 
1979, 1990–2 
1986, 2006–7 
1973–4, 1989–91, 2001 
1988–9, 1999 
1973–4, 1989–90, 2001–2 





1975–6, 1987–8, 2000 
1973, 1988–9, 2000–2 
1970–1 
1970–1, 2009 
1970, 1983–5, 2009 
1982, 2009 
1970–1, 1984–6, 2009 
1993–5 
1970–1, 1996–7 






1982, 1984, 2009 
1986, 2009 
2009 
1982–3, 2004–5, 2009 










1976–7, 1982, 1992, 2009 








1982–4, 1994–5, 2009 
1983, 1994–6, 2009 
1983–5, 2007–9 
1977, 1984–5, 1995–6 
1983, 1992–3 
1977, 1992–5, 2009 
  Booms in private investment  Busts in private investment 















1972, 1977, 1991, 2000
1989–90 





1973, 1978–9, 2003 
1979, 2005–6 























1974, 1988–90, 1999–2000 
1975, 1998–2000 
1973–4, 1989–90, 2000 
1973, 1979, 2001–3 
1979, 1997–9 
1974, 1980, 1989–90, 2001–2
1986, 1998–9 
1973–4, 1988, 1999–2000 
1987–9, 2007 
1988–9, 1997–8 
1970, 1983–6, 2009 
1981–6 
1975, 1987 
1981–3, 1993, 2009 
1984–5, 2009 
1992–5 
1970, 1984–5, 1996–7 




1970, 1984–6, 2009 
1993–5 
1981, 1993–4, 2009 
1975, 1982–4, 2009 
1981–3 
1974–6, 2002–3 




1975–6, 1981–4, 2009 
1985, 2008–9 
1983, 1993–4, 2009 
1976, 1981–3, 2003–4, 2009
1976 
1992–4 










1976, 1982–3, 1993, 2009
1994, 2002–4 
1976, 1985, 1995, 2003–5
1992–3, 2009 
1992–3, 2009 
* AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, 
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